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STATE V. MCPARTLAND:  APPLYING THE 
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 
STANDARD TO SECONDARY SCREENING 
REFERRALS AT SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS IN 
MAINE AND THE PROPER ROLE OF THE LAW 
COURT IN REVIEWING A TRIAL COURT’S 
APPLICATION OF THIS STANDARD 
Holly L. Doherty* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In State v. McPartland,1 Mallory McPartland challenged her conviction for 
operating under the influence, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied her 
motion to suppress evidence obtained in a sobriety checkpoint that led to her 
arrest.2  In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, sitting as the Law 
Court, affirmed the judgment against McPartland.3 
This case centered on a matter of first impression in Maine—what 
constitutional standard should a law enforcement officer apply when determining 
whether a motorist, lawfully stopped at a sobriety checkpoint, may be kept for 
secondary screening?4  The majority concluded, and the dissent agreed, that the 
appropriate standard is that a law enforcement officer must have a “reasonable 
articulable suspicion” that a motorist is driving under the influence in order to refer 
the motorist for secondary screening.5  The difference between the dissent and the 
majority, however, was that the dissent did not believe that the standard was met in 
this case.6  
In determining that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard was not met 
in this case, the dissent failed to recognize the proper roles of the trial court and the 
Law Court in applying the standard and neglected to take relevant precedent into 
account.  The majority opinion was not flawless either, however, as it did not 
adequately address the problematic dissenting opinion.  This Note explores the 
proper roles of the trial court in making decisions based on the reasonable 
articulable suspicion standard and the Law Court in reviewing those decisions.  
This Note also examines the relevant case law that should have been considered by 
the dissent in its reasoning.  Analysis of these matters leads to the conclusion that, 
had the dissent properly understood the respective roles of the two courts, and had 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Maine School of Law.  I would like to thank Professor 
Melvyn Zarr for his invaluable insight and advice on this Note, as well as the Maine Law Review editors 
and staff for their hard work in the editing process.  I would also like to thank my family and friends for 
their ongoing support.    
 1. 2012 ME 12, 36 A.3d 881. 
 2. Id. ¶ 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. ¶ 6. 
 5. Id. ¶ 1. 
 6. Id. ¶ 18 (Jabar, J., dissenting). 
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it taken into account the precedent set by the Law Court, there would have been a 
unanimous decision affirming the trial court’s judgment. 
II.  THE MCPARTLAND CASE 
A.  Factual and Procedural Background 
On the night of August 27, 2010, the Old Town Police Department conducted 
a sobriety checkpoint on Stillwater Avenue in Old Town, Maine.7  There were six 
officers involved in the checkpoint, and they were to stop every vehicle and have a 
“brief conversation” with the driver.8  Officer Christine McAvoy was one of the 
officers assigned to the checkpoint that night.9   
At approximately 2 a.m., Mallory McPartland was driving on Stillwater 
Avenue and approached the checkpoint.10  Officer McAvoy made the observation 
that McPartland was driving toward the checkpoint at a faster rate compared to 
other vehicles that night, estimating her speed to be thirty-five miles per hour in a 
twenty-five mile-per-hour zone.11  However, despite traveling at a faster rate, 
McPartland appropriately stopped at the checkpoint.12  Officer McAvoy observed 
no other questionable conduct at that time.13  When Officer McAvoy spoke with 
McPartland, she did not observe any signs that McPartland had been drinking.14  
However, during the course of their conversation, McPartland admitted that she 
had consumed a martini at a restaurant or pub at approximately 10 p.m.15  Officer 
McAvoy referred McPartland to secondary screening16 based on her observation 
that McPartland had been speeding and on McPartland’s admission that she had 
consumed alcohol that night.17  McPartland was ultimately charged with operating 
                                                                                                     
 7. Id. ¶ 2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. ¶ 3. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. ¶ 4. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Secondary screening involves additional testing to determine whether a driver is impaired.  See 
59 AM. JUR. Trials § 79 (1996) (“Field sobriety tests, or FSTs, are exercises that test a subject’s balance, 
coordination, recollection, and ability to follow instructions.  Observation of FST performance provides 
insight into a driver’s condition and, inferentially, into a driver’s ability to safely operate a motor 
vehicle. FSTs are qualitative, gauging the effect of drug or alcohol ingestion, rather than quantitative. . . 
. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has approved and standardized five 
tests for use in ascertaining a driver’s sobriety: (1) the Romberg Balance test, (2) the Walk and Turn 
test, (3) the One Leg Stand test, (4) the Finger to Nose test, and (5) Gaze Nystagmus tests.  The first four 
test balance and divided attention, or the ability to perform multiple tasks simultaneously. . . . There are 
a number of nonstandardized sobriety tests used by field officers in the course of their normal DWI and 
DUI investigations.  Use of a particular nonstandardized test may be limited to certain officers or 
departments in a jurisdiction.  These include alphabet tests, number tests, and finger counting dexterity 
tests.  Their use is probative to the extent that they elicit conduct that can be evaluated.”). 
 17. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶¶ 4, 20, 36 A.3d 881. 
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under the influence.18 
McPartland filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that Officer McAvoy 
did not have “sufficient justification” to refer her for a secondary screening after 
the initial stop.19  At the suppression hearing, the trial court determined that 
“McPartland’s admission of alcohol consumption, coupled with Officer McAvoy’s 
estimate that McPartland had approached the roadblock at an elevated speed, ‘taken 
together [were] sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion of at least some limited 
impairment.’”20  Accordingly, the trial court denied McPartland’s motion to 
suppress.21  McPartland then entered a conditional guilty plea to operating under 
the influence in the Unified Criminal Docket, and she was subsequently 
convicted.22  McPartland thereafter appealed to the Law Court, arguing that the trial 
court “erred in concluding that [Officer McAvoy] . . .  had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion of impairment that was sufficient to justify additional sobriety 
screening.”23 
B.  The Majority Opinion 
A majority of the Law Court acknowledged that the issue presented in this case 
was one of first impression in Maine—what constitutional standard must law 
enforcement officers apply when determining whether to refer a motorist for 
secondary screening at a lawful sobriety checkpoint?24  The majority first examined 
the dicta of a leading United States Supreme Court case, Michigan Department of 
State Police v. Sitz,25 the decisions of other states’ appellate courts,26 and the work 
of Fourth Amendment scholar Wayne R. LaFave,27 all of which applied a 
reasonable articulable suspicion standard.28  The majority also pointed out that the 
Law Court had applied the same standard in its own case law “concerning the 
constitutional propriety of a motorist’s continued detention after a lawful stop 
based on a civil traffic infraction.”29  Furthermore, the majority noted that, in a 
                                                                                                     
 18. Id. ¶ 1.  See also 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(1-A)(A)(1)-(2) (2011) (“A person commits OUI if that 
person:  A. Operates a motor vehicle:  (1) While under the influence of intoxicants; or (2) While having 
an alcohol level of 0.08 grams or more of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood of 210 liters of breath.”).  
“A driver is operating under the influence if her mental or physical faculties or senses are impaired to 
the slightest degree or to any extent.”  McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 16, 36 A.3d 881.  
 19. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 5, 36 A.3d 881. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. ¶ 1.   
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. ¶ 6. 
 25. 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (“Detention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety 
testing may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard.”). 
 26. See Mullinax v. State, 938 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Ark. 1997); People v. Bruni, 940 N.E.2d 84, 86 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 910 N.E.2d 281, 287-89 (Mass. 2009); Commonwealth 
v. Bazinet, 924 N.E.2d 755, 757 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010); State v. Eggleston, 671 N.E.2d 1325, 1331 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
 27. 5 SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.8(d) at 378-79 (4th 
ed. 2004). 
 28. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 7, 36 A.3d 881. 
 29. Id. ¶ 8. 
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recent case,30 the Law Court had suggested that analyzing the validity of an 
officer’s referral of a motorist to secondary screening at a sobriety checkpoint 
“might include a reasonable suspicion component.”31  Based on the Court’s 
analysis of these authorities, the majority expressed the following standard: a law 
enforcement officer who stops a motorist at a sobriety checkpoint must have an 
objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that the motorist is operating under the 
influence—“even to the slightest degree”—in order to refer the motorist for 
secondary screening.32   
Next, the majority applied this standard, undertaking a two-step inquiry to 
determine whether the State had satisfied its burden in showing that the officer’s 
actions “‘were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.’”33  First, the 
majority reviewed the trial court’s findings for clear error.34  The trial court had 
found that Officer McAvoy “subjectively suspected McPartland of driving while 
impaired,” and the majority concluded that there was competent evidence in the 
record to support this finding.35  According to the majority, this competent 
evidence included McPartland’s admission to having consumed a martini earlier 
that evening, the time of night she was driving, and her speed as she approached 
the checkpoint.36   
Second, the majority reviewed de novo the trial court’s “conclusion that the 
officer’s subjective suspicion was objectively reasonable as a matter of law.”37  The 
majority stated that a motorist’s admission to having consumed alcohol “may be 
considered by a police officer in determining whether the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the [motorist] might be impaired.”38  The majority also 
noted that both speeding and driving in the early morning hours can be “suggestive 
of impairment.”39  Therefore, given the “totality of the circumstances,” the majority 
ultimately determined that there was a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
McPartland was operating under the influence.40  Accordingly, the majority 
concluded that the motion to suppress was properly denied and affirmed the 
judgment.41 
C.  The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent agreed with the standard set forth by the majority but did not agree 
with the majority’s finding that the standard was satisfied in this case.42  The 
dissent applied the same two-step inquiry undertaken by the majority.43  First, the 
                                                                                                     
 30. State v. Kent, 2011 ME 42, 15 A.3d 1286. 
 31. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 9, 36 A.3d 881 (citing Kent, 2011 ME 42, ¶ 4, 15 A.3d 1286). 
 32. Id. ¶ 16. 
 33. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 7, 814 A.2d 984). 
 34. Id. ¶ 13.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. ¶ 14. 
 37. Id. ¶ 12. 
 38. Id. ¶ 15. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. ¶ 17. 
 42. Id. ¶ 18 (Jabar, J., dissenting).   
 43. Id. ¶ 19. 
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dissent reviewed the trial court’s factual finding that Officer McAvoy subjectively 
suspected that McPartland was operating under the influence.44  In reviewing the 
trial court’s factual findings, the dissent addressed Officer McAvoy’s testimony 
that she had relied on McPartland’s speed as she approached the checkpoint and 
her admission to having consumed alcohol as justification for referring McPartland 
for secondary screening.45  The dissent determined that, based on this testimony, 
Officer McAvoy “could not have harbored a legitimate, subjective concern that 
McPartland was operating under the influence at the time of the initial roadblock 
stop.”46   
In support of its finding, the dissent focused specifically on Officer McAvoy’s 
testimony that she would refer a motorist to secondary screening if she had a 
reasonable suspicion that the motorist “‘had been drinking.’”47  The dissent argued 
that, while an admission to having consumed alcohol was a “factor in the calculus,” 
an officer basing her decision to refer a motorist to secondary screening on a 
“‘reasonable suspicion’ that the motorist had been ‘drinking’” was not the 
appropriate “‘reasonable suspicion’ standard.”48  Rather, the dissent argued, an 
officer must have a reasonable suspicion that a motorist is operating under the 
influence.49  The dissent suggested that a standard that requires a reasonable 
suspicion that a motorist had been drinking is distinct from a standard that requires 
a reasonable suspicion that a motorist is operating under the influence, arguing that 
the former creates a “lower subjective threshold than would ordinarily be required 
to sustain an extended OUI investigation.”50  Accordingly, the dissent determined 
that Officer McAvoy’s referral of McPartland to secondary screening based on her 
subjective suspicion that she had been drinking was not synonymous with a 
subjective suspicion that McPartland was operating under the influence, which was 
the proper standard.51   
Additionally, the dissent argued that evidence of McPartland’s speed as she 
approached the checkpoint “played only an incidental role in Officer McAvoy’s 
articulated reason for referring [McPartland] to secondary screening.”52  In support 
of this argument, the dissent pointed out the following facts: the stop was for the 
purposes of the sobriety checkpoint and not due to McPartland’s speed; McPartland 
“properly slowed and stopped” as directed; and Officer McAvoy “did not otherwise 
equate McPartland’s speed . . . with the type of ‘erratic driving or swerving’ that 
would normally be indicative of a motorist’s impaired faculties.”53   
Under the second step of the inquiry, the dissent argued that Officer McAvoy 
did not have an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that McPartland was 
operating under the influence since she had “initially employed the incorrect legal 
                                                                                                     
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. ¶ 20. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (quoting Officer McAvoy). 
 48. Id. ¶ 21. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. ¶ 22. 
 53. Id. 
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standard” when she referred McPartland to secondary screening.54  The dissent 
found this to be “especially true” in this case because Officer McAvoy “did not 
observe any indicia of intoxication or impairment.”55  Based on the preceding 
analysis, the dissent concluded that the motion to suppress should have been 
granted by the trial court.56 
III.  THE ROLES OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE LAW COURT 
A trial court engages in a two-step process when reaching a decision.57  First, 
the judge must determine questions of fact consisting of “‘historical facts,’ i.e., 
facts ‘in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their 
narrators.’”58  When applying a reasonable suspicion standard, the questions of fact 
involve “[t]he nature of the detaining officer’s subjective suspicion and the nature 
of the observations upon which that suspicion is based.”59  Based on its finding of 
“facts known to the officer” and the officer’s credibility, a trial court determines 
whether the officer “subjectively entertained a concern”60 that a motorist was 
engaged in “criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety.”61   
Second, the judge must determine questions of law whereby the judge 
“draw[s] legal conclusions from these facts.”62  The question of law under such a 
reasonable suspicion standard is “[w]hether an officer’s suspicion is objectively 
reasonable.”63  In making such a determination, a trial court must consider the 
“events which occurred leading up to the stop . . . and . . . whether those historical 
facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, 
amount to reasonable suspicion.”64  Reasonable suspicion is not a standard that can 
be “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”65  However, the 
standard does require “more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch,”66 and 
the court must take the totality of the circumstances into account.67     
                                                                                                     
 54. Id. ¶ 23. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. ¶ 24. 
 57. State v. Cefalo, 396 A.2d 233, 239 (Me. 1979). 
 58. Id. (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1963)).   
 59. State v. Fillion, 474 A.2d 187, 190 (Me. 1984).   
 60. State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 14, 814 A.2d 984. 
 61. Id. ¶ 11. 
 62. Cefalo, 396 A.2d at 239. 
 63. State v. Cusack, 649 A.2d 16, 18 (Me. 1994) (citing State v. Nelson, 638 A.2d 720, 722 (Me. 
1994); Fillion, 474 A.2d at 190). 
 64. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). 
 65. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).  See also Cusack, 649 A.2d at 18 (citing State v. 
Carnevale, 598 A.2d 746, 749 (Me. 1991) (“There is no mechanical standard by which we review a 
court’s finding of reasonableness.”).  
 66. State v. Porter, 2008 ME 175, ¶ 9, 960 A.2d 321. 
 67. State v. Dulac, 600 A.2d 1121, 1121-22 (Me. 1992).  See, e.g., Cusack, 649 A.2d at 18-19 (“We 
find here that the officer had more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch that the driver was 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence.  Based upon the combined circumstances of defendant’s 
speed, repeated drifting, and the early morning hour, the District Court did not err in finding that the 
officer was justified in stopping the defendant.  Although the circumstances of this case may not rise to 
the level of erratic driving found in several of our recent cases, State v. Pelletier, 541 A.2d 1296, 1297 
(Me. 1988), Carnevale, 598 A.2d 746, and State v. Burnham, 610 A.2d 733 (Me. 1992), the combined 
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In reviewing a trial court’s decision, the Law Court also engages in a two-step 
inquiry.68  First, the Law Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings “to 
determine whether those findings are supported by the record.”69  A trial court’s 
factual findings are given “considerable deference” because, unlike the Law Court, 
a trial court “has had the opportunity to hear the witnesses and assess their 
credibility.”70  Accordingly, a trial court’s factual findings “will be overturned only 
when clearly erroneous.”71   
Second, the Law Court reviews a trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.72  The 
Law Court conducts an independent examination of whether application of the law 
to the facts “warrants a particular legal conclusion.”73  Thus, like the trial court, the 
Law Court determines whether the officer harbored an articulable suspicion that 
was “objectively reasonable in light of all the circumstances.”74  The approach 
taken by the Law Court is also seen in the United States Supreme Court:  
[A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion . . . should be 
reviewed de novo on appeal.  Having said this, we hasten to point out that a 
reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for 
clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident 
judges and local law enforcement officers. 75  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Under the first step of the two-step inquiry undertaken by both the majority 
and the dissent in reviewing the trial court’s finding of reasonable articulable 
suspicion, the factual findings of the trial court were to be given considerable 
deference and set aside only if clearly erroneous.76  The case of State v. Sylvain77 is 
                                                                                                     
facts . . . are sufficient to support the conclusion that the officer’s suspicion was objectively 
reasonable.”)  
 68. State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 12, 36 A.3d 881. 
 69. State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 8, 814 A.2d 984 (citing State v. Cefalo, 396 A.2d 233, 240 (Me. 
1979)).   
 70. Id. (citing Cefalo, 396 A.2d at 239).  See also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700 
(1996) (“A trial judge views the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and events of 
the community; likewise, a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and 
expertise.  The background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield 
inferences that deserve deference. . . .  An appeals court should give due weight to a trial court’s finding 
that the officer was credible and the inference was reasonable.”).  
 71. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 10, 814 A.2d 984.   
 72. Id. ¶ 9.  See also State v. Brown, 675 A.2d 504, 505 (Me. 1996) (citing State v. Dube, 655 A.2d 
338, 340 (Me. 1995)) (“A ruling on a motion to suppress based on undisputed facts, however involves a 
legal conclusion that we independently review.”). 
 73. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 9, 814 A.2d 984 (citing Cefalo, 396 A.2d at 239).  See also State v. 
Cusack, 649 A.2d 16, 18 (Me. 1994) (“The key question on . . . appeal is whether the District Court 
properly applied legal principles to the undisputed facts in finding the officer’s suspicions to be 
objectively reasonable.”); Cefalo, 396 A.2d at 239 (“[T]he Law Court has a special responsibility to 
exercise its independent judgment to determine the validity of legal conclusions that are dispositive of a 
defendant’s claim that he has been denied fair treatment in a criminal proceeding.”).   
 74. State v. Wood, 662 A.2d 919, 920 (Me. 1995).  
 75. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699 
 76. State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 12, 36 A.3d 881.  
 77. 2003 ME 5, 814 A.2d 984. 
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instructive on the proper role of the Law Court in reviewing the trial court’s factual 
findings.  Sylvain involved a roadside stop of a single vehicle78 rather than a 
sobriety checkpoint, but the same reasonable articulable suspicion standard was 
applied.79   
In Sylvain, a state trooper pulled over the defendant after observing that his 
truck had a non-functional headlight.80  The trooper then observed that the 
defendant had bloodshot eyes.81  When the trooper asked whether the defendant 
had recently been drinking, the defendant stated that he had consumed two beers.82  
The trooper then instructed the defendant to perform field sobriety tests.83  The 
defendant was subsequently charged with operating under the influence, and the 
trial court granted his motion to suppress evidence obtained during his field 
sobriety tests.84  On appeal, the State challenged “both the findings of fact and the 
application of the constitutional principles to those facts.”85  In a unanimous 
opinion, the Law Court appropriately reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for 
clear error only.86  The trial court had made factual findings that the defendant’s 
truck had one headlight out, that the defendant had bloodshot eyes, and that the 
defendant had admitted to consuming two beers.87  The Law Court determined that 
these findings were supported by the record and therefore would not be disturbed.88  
Furthermore, the trial court had found that the trooper had a subjective suspicion 
that the defendant was operating under the influence.89  The Law Court deferred to 
the trial court and “accept[ed] [its] factual finding on that point.”90   
As in Sylvain, the majority in McPartland appropriately deferred to the fact-
finding role of the trial court in its review of the court’s factual findings, 
determining only that “competent evidence support[ed] the suppression court’s 
findings.”91  The dissent in McPartland, however, did not defer to the trial court.  
Rather, the dissent concluded that Officer McAvoy “could not, as a matter of law, 
have harbored a subjective suspicion that McPartland was impaired.”92  In reaching 
this conclusion, the dissent disregarded the trial court’s interpretation of Officer 
McAvoy’s testimony as fact-finder and improperly substituted its own 
interpretation of the facts.   
In conducting its own fact-finding, the McPartland dissent focused primarily 
on a distinction between alcohol consumption and alcohol impairment.93  This was 
                                                                                                     
 78. Id. ¶ 2. 
 79. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 
 80. Id. ¶ 2. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. ¶ 5. 
 85. Id. ¶ 11. 
 86. See id. ¶ 12-13. 
 87. Id. ¶ 12. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. ¶ 13. 
 90. Id. 
 91. State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 13, 36 A.3d 881. 
 92. Id. ¶ 13 n. 2. 
 93. See id. ¶¶ 20-21(Jabar, J., dissenting). 
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a distinction first raised in State v. Nelson.94  In Nelson, an officer had observed the 
defendant drinking a beer in a parked truck.95  When the defendant began to drive 
off, the officer proceeded to pull him over.96  The officer had not observed anything 
unusual about the defendant’s driving.97  The defendant was subsequently charged 
with operating under the influence, and the trial court denied his motion to suppress 
evidence obtained in the stop.98  On appeal, a majority of the Court held that the 
trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding “a clear 
deficiency in the evidence supporting the reasonableness of the suspicion.”99  In 
reaching this decision, the Court noted that “[t]here was no evidence that the officer 
observed indicia of physical impairment or anything unusual in Nelson’s 
appearance.”100  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the officer “observed 
nothing to support his suspicion that [the defendant] was operating under the 
influence of alcohol other than [the defendant’s] consumption of a single can of 
beer over the course of nearly an hour.”101  The Court appeared to base this 
conclusion on the fact that alcohol consumption in a parked vehicle by an adult is 
“neither a crime nor a civil violation.”102 
The Law Court later clarified the holding of Nelson in Sylvain, noted above.103  
In Sylvain, the trial court had concluded that the trooper’s suspicion was not 
objectively reasonable as a matter of law, drawing from Nelson “that the mere 
admission to previously drinking alcohol by a person operating a vehicle is 
insufficient to give [an officer] authority to request a further brief intrusion into the 
driver’s life through the performance of sobriety tests.”104  The Law Court in 
Sylvain concluded that the trial court’s finding came from an inappropriate 
“intermingling of the separate concepts of legality and articulable suspicion.”105   
While it may not be a crime solely to consume an alcoholic beverage and then 
operate a motor vehicle, it is a crime to operate while impaired.  Thus, the officer 
in a roadside stop is not focused on whether the operator was legally entitled to 
consume alcohol before operating the vehicle, but whether that consumption has 
resulted in any level of impairment.  An officer deciding whether or not to ask an 
operator to demonstrate that the operator is not impaired in any way by the 
consumption of alcohol or drugs need only entertain a reasonable suspicion that 
impairment may exist.106 
Accordingly, the Court in Sylvain found that the trooper’s suspicion was 
objectively reasonable based on his observation that the defendant’s eyes were 
                                                                                                     
 94. 638 A.2d 720 (Me. 1994). 
 95. Id. at 721. 
 96. Id. at 721-22. 
 97. Id. at 722. 
 98. Id. at 721. 
 99. Id. at 722. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 18, 814 A.2d 984. 
 104. Id. ¶ 16. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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bloodshot and the defendant’s admission to having consumed two beers.107  The 
Court unanimously concluded that the motion to suppress should have been 
denied.108   
The distinction between consumption and impairment resurfaced in State v. 
King.109  In King, an officer pulled over the defendant’s vehicle after observing that 
its muffler was dragging.110  While speaking with the defendant, the officer smelled 
alcohol on her breath and saw beer bottles or cans in the vehicle.111  When asked if 
she had consumed any alcohol that night, the defendant admitted to drinking five 
beers but stated that she did not feel impaired.112  The officer then asked the 
defendant to “describe on a scale of one to ten the effects of the alcohol she had 
consumed” and the defendant indicated a three.113  The officer had not observed 
anything unusual about the defendant’s appearance, functioning, or the manner in 
which she had been driving.114  The officer proceeded to administer field sobriety 
tests, and the defendant was charged with operating under the influence.115  The 
trial court in King subsequently granted the defendant’s motion to suppress 
evidence obtained from the field sobriety tests. 116  Like the trial court in Sylvain, 
the trial court in King “emphasized the distinction between evidence of impairment 
and evidence of consumption,” citing to Nelson as support for its ruling.117  On 
appeal, the Law Court in King again made efforts to clarify the holding in Nelson: 
In Sylvain, we clarified that Nelson does not stand for the proposition that 
something more than a motorist’s mere admission that he or she consumed alcohol 
is required for a reasonable suspicion.  On the contrary, we reaffirmed that an 
officer does not need objective evidence of the impairment itself; rather, the 
officer “need only entertain a reasonable suspicion that impairment may exist.”118   
The Court in King concluded that the totality of the circumstances and the 
evidence established “as a matter of law, an objectively reasonably suspicion that 
[the defendant] might have been impaired,” and this was sufficient to deny the 
defendant’s motion to suppress.119  
It appears that the McPartland dissent, like the trial courts in Sylvain and King, 
focused on distinguishing between consumption of alcohol and alcohol impairment.  
As noted above, the trial courts in Sylvain and King, relying on Nelson, determined 
that a motorist’s admission to the consumption of alcohol was not sufficient to find 
an objectively reasonable suspicion that the driver was operating under the 
influence.  The McPartland dissent made a similar argument.  The dissenting 
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judges focused on Officer McAvoy’s testimony that she would direct a vehicle to 
an area for secondary screening “‘if she had a reasonable suspicion that the 
operator of a vehicle had been drinking.’”120  Based on this testimony, the dissent 
argued that Officer McAvoy’s reason for referring McPartland to secondary 
screening was based only on her subjective suspicion that “McPartland had 
consumed alcohol, not that the consumption had in any way impaired her ability to 
operate a vehicle.”121  However, as articulated in Sylvain and again in King, 
drawing such a distinction—and concluding that mere consumption of alcohol is an 
insufficient basis for conducting further tests—is incorrect.  The Law Court 
clarified in both Sylvain and King that an officer “does not need objective evidence 
of the impairment itself;”122 rather, a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
impairment “‘may exist’” is sufficient.123   
Additionally, the McPartland dissent questioned the factual findings of the 
trial court concerning McPartland’s speed in approaching the checkpoint.  The 
dissent noted that McPartland had “properly slowed and stopped” when she got to 
the checkpoint and that Officer McAvoy “did not otherwise equate McPartland’s 
speed . . . with the type of ‘erratic driving or swerving’ that would normally be 
indicative of a motorist’s impaired faculties.”124  Accordingly, the dissent 
concluded that Officer McAvoy’s “subjective ‘concern’” about McPartland’s speed 
as she approached the checkpoint “played only an incidental role in Officer 
McAvoy’s articulated reason for referring her to secondary screening.”125  The 
applicable standard of review does not call for the Law Court to make such an 
interpretation of the facts.  It was for the trial court, as the fact-finder, to interpret 
the testimony and draw inferences from the evidence to determine whether Officer 
McAvoy held the requisite subjective suspicion that McPartland was operating 
under the influence.  And the trial court, based on its findings of fact and its 
interpretation of those facts, determined that Officer McAvoy did hold the requisite 
subjective suspicion.  Therefore, with the evidence supported by the record, the 
dissent should have deferred to the factual findings of the trial court. 
Had the dissenters properly deferred to the factual findings of the trial court, 
they still could have made their argument that Officer McAvoy’s suspicion was not 
objectively reasonable as a matter of law because the Court is entitled to conduct a 
de novo review on this point.  However, the primary argument made by the dissent 
is not supported by Law Court precedent, as noted above.  The dissent relied on 
Nelson to argue that, because McPartland did not show “any indicia of intoxication 
or impairment,” Officer McAvoy’s suspicion that McPartland was operating under 
the influence was not objectively reasonable.126  However, as previously noted, the 
decisions of Sylvain and King made it clear that such “indicia” were not necessary 
to meet the reasonable articulable suspicion standard. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The McPartland dissent agreed with the majority’s conclusion that a 
reasonable articulable suspicion standard should be used to determine whether an 
officer was justified in referring a motorist stopped at a sobriety checkpoint for 
secondary screening.  However, in reviewing the trial court’s factual findings, the 
dissent failed to limit itself to the proper standard of review.  Rather than review for 
clear error only, the dissent engaged in its own fact-finding exercise, interpreting 
Officer McAvoy’s testimony itself and drawing its own inferences from the 
evidence.  In essence, the dissent conducted its own independent review of the 
evidence, thereby diminishing the fact-finding role of the trial court.  The dissent 
did not give the trial court the considerable deference it is entitled to in determining 
questions of fact.  Furthermore, in conducting its analysis, the dissent did not take 
into account the precedent previously set forth by the Law Court in Sylvain and 
King.  Had these cases been addressed and their principles understood, the dissent 
would not have concluded that McPartland’s motion to suppress should have been 
granted.   
Finally, although the McPartland majority applied the proper standard of 
review, its opinion did not adequately address the dissent’s review of the trial 
court’s factual findings.  In footnote 2 of the opinion, the majority acknowledged 
that the dissent had erroneously substituted its own interpretation of the evidence 
for that of the trial court.127  Such error is significant, and had the dissent gained 
just one more vote, the motion to suppress would have been granted.  In order to 
strengthen its argument, especially when faced with three dissenters, the majority 
should have devoted more than just a footnote to addressing the problem with the 
dissenting opinion’s standard of review.  Had more time been given to exposing the 
flaws of the dissent’s reasoning, the majority could have undermined the influence 
of the dissenting opinion. 
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